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Abstract 
Ombudsmen and Supreme Audit Offices can form a source for innovation in the 
public sector. Their recommendations constitute an external pressure for 
organizations to improve and innovate. Since these recommendations are 
usually not compulsory, their effect is highly dependend on organizational 
factors at the receiving end. This paper discusses the facets of three of the most 
complex and all-encompasing concepts to influence receptiveness and 
effectiveness of policy recommendation: feedback, accountability and learning. 
Based on an exensive literature review the authors explain the many aspects of 
these factors, and show how they cause and influence change and innovation, 
with a specific focus on the public sector. The authors conclude with 
recommendations for further research, based on the explanatory model that 
feedback, accountability and learning could form for differentiation in change 
and innovation patterns, failures and successes.  
Key words: Change, Innovation, Public Sector, Feedback, Accountability, 
Learning 
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 Introduction 
 
Working Group 3 of the LIPSE project1, of which this working paper is a result, focused on 
innovations in public administrations on the one hand, and policy recommendations by Supreme 
Audit Institutions (SAIs) and Ombudsmen on the other. Concerning these research goals, we 
focused on the research question: How do Ombudsmen and SAIS influence public sector 
innovation? The policy recommendations these institutions publish, based on their respective 
investigations or audits, form an external stimulus for change and innovation. However, these 
recommendations in itself will not cause any change, and won’t be any kind of inspiration, if 
internal structures for change in the public sector organizations under scrutiny are not 
susceptible for change and innovation. The literature suggests that three processes and 
mechanisms play an important role in the initiation of change, and thus the effectiveness of SAIs 
and Ombudsman recommendations: feedback, accountability and learning. We are interested to 
know if they play a decisive role in sustaining or regenerating change, and if so, in what way? By 
investigation the influence of these factors, we will be able to say when and how Ombudsmen and 
SAIs recommendations will have any effect in constituting change and fostering innovation. 
On the basis of an extensive literature review, on which we will further expand in chapter two, we 
have found theoretical and empirical arguments supporting the thesis that feedback, 
accountability and learning might play a decisive role in the patterns of change and innovation 
within public sector organizations. In short, these arguments come down to this: 
- Feedback information allows an organization to correct its errors, to adjust its goals, to 
restore its performance levels, and to align itself with its environment (Van der Knaap, 
1995; Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Morgan, 2006; Katz & Kahn, 1978; Downs, 1967; Walker, 2013). 
- Accountability mechanisms, more specifically the public nature of the account giving and 
the possibility of sanctions, may provide the incentive for public officials to actually make 
changes in order to improve the performance of their organization (Bovens et al., 2008; 
Wynen et al., 2014).2 
- Finally, an organization which is characterized by a learning culture, has an open and 
receptive attitude towards different opinions and alternative ways of doing things, and 
has a tolerance for errors and risk-taking. Ideally, this open mindset is supplemented with 
structural and procedural arrangements that allow organizations to actively search for 
and process relevant feedback information, and to share this information within the 
organization and beyond (Garvin et al., 2008; Popper & Lipshitz, 2000; Greiling & 
Halachmi, 2013). 
 
Our expectation is that different constellations of these three dimensions (together called the FAL-
model) at the level of the organization will lead to different patterns of change and innovation. 
These factors form the fertile ground in which the seeds, policy recommendations by Ombudsmen 
and SAIs for example, can blossom into successful social innovation.   
                                                          
1 More info can be found at www.lipse.org 
2 However, an accountability regime which focuses too harshly on mistakes and sanctions may discourage 
entrepreneurship, risk-taking, initiative and creativity, and instead may provoke defensive routines, 
paralysis and window-dressing (Van Loocke & Put, 2011; Bovens, 2005; Bovens et al., 2008; Behn, 2001; 
Hartley, 2005). 
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 In this working paper we will investigate the extensive body of literature surrounding the 
factors Feedback, Accountability and Learning. All three are comprised of many facets, and 
influence innovation in their own particular ways. After giving a short introduction on the issues 
and particularities of public sector innovation, we will respectively delve into the literature of 
factors enabling or disabling public sector innovation through Learning, Feedback and 
Accountability. 
 Public Sector Innovation 
Many observers are critical of the innovative nature of the public sector. It has been argued that 
the political, democratic and legal context of public administration constitute an impediment to 
innovation. Several reasons can be given for this. Drawing on the work of Bekkers et al. (2011), 
Bekkers et al. (2013) and Pollitt (2011), we discuss a few of these reasons: lack of competition, 
risk-avoidance, short-termism, and rule-obsession. 
1.1.1 Lack of competition  
Many observers indicate that competition is one of the most important incentives for 
improvement and innovation. Organizations in a competitive environment can only survive if they 
are able to create new products, new services, more efficient production methods, better and 
more efficient ways of delivering services, and so on. Public sector organizations, however, are 
often in a monopolistic position. Citizens often have no choice but to be clients of the public 
organization in question. It is argued that since the public sector lacks competition, it also lacks 
incentives to improve and to innovate (Bekkers et al., 2011). 
1.1.2 Risk-avoidance 
Innovation is risky business. Innovations often come about through a risky process, involving 
experimentation, trial and error, and uncertain outcomes (Pollitt, 2011; Levitt & March, 1988). 
Innovation can be seen as a journey which is not linear and rational but which leads to dead-ends, 
mistakes, setbacks, and obstacles. As a consequence, mistakes and failures are part of any 
innovation process (Bekkers et al., 2013; Hartley, 2005). 
However, bureaucratic and political cultures are often viewed as risk-avoiding cultures. Risk and 
risk-taking are generally negatively perceived by public sector organizations (Bekkers et al, 
2011). The reasons for this are obvious. First of all, government works with public money. It is 
very hard for politicians and other public office holders to “persuade the media and the public that 
it is acceptable, in certain contexts and under certain conditions, to spend public money on things 
that turn out to be failures” (Pollitt, 2011, p. 39). 
Secondly, decision-makers and implementers carry responsibility for failure. They are often 
harshly penalized for failures, both by public accountability mechanisms and by the media (Pollitt, 
2011; Gilson et al., 2009). As a consequence, politicians and public managers are cautious to 
support radical innovations because there is a risk of failure, and hence a risk of getting blamed 
and penalized. Risk-, error-, and blame-avoidance thus become central characteristics of the 
public sector: public managers tend to make safe decisions in order to avoid risk and blame 
(Howlett, 2012; Bernier et al., 2007; Gilson et al., 2009; Bekkers et al., 2011). 
1.1.3 Short-termism 
A systematic, long-term, and goal-oriented perspective can create a fertile breeding ground for 
innovation (Drucker, 1985 – In Bekkers et al., 2011). However, public administration is under 
the influence of the political realm, which does not value long-term progress. Politicians want 
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quick results in order to safeguard their mandates at the next election (Bekkers et al., 2011). 
This short-term orientation increases delivery pressures and forces public office holders to 
minimize risk-taking (Bekkers et al., 2013). 
1.1.4 Rule-obsession 
The public sector is dominated by a bureaucratic culture in which compliance with rules and 
procedures is highly valued. And rightly so, because rules and procedures provide legal security 
and equity, which are important public values. The downside is that rules and procedures can 
become ends in themselves. They become accepted practices and their purpose is never 
questioned. When this is the case, these rules and procedures may limit the way in which new 
concepts, methods, technologies and processes are accepted – in other words, they may impede 
innovation (Bekkers et al., 2013). 
These four characteristics of the public sector are not beneficial to innovation. However, there is 
no reason for despair. The different strands of research dealing with innovation mention many 
other potential drivers for innovation. Three important fields of study in this respect are: the body 
of literature on learning and cognition; the body of literature on systems, feedback, and 
environment; and the body of literature on accountability (in particular the learning and 
improving function of accountability).  
In the following paragraphs, we will explore and discuss these lines of research. On the basis of 
this research review, we identify three dimensions which we claim are important for innovation: 
feedback, accountability, and learning. Moreover, we will develop a list of questions to measure 
the degree to which feedback, accountability and learning mechanisms are present in public 
sector organizations and to assess the characteristics of these mechanisms. On the basis of this 
questionnaire, we will then test whether or not these mechanisms are indeed conducive to 
innovation and if so, under which circumstances. 
 Learning 
Scholars from different research areas have conceptualized learning in different ways. 
2.1 Cybernetic system learning: corrective system learning on the 
basis of feedback 
Many authors have looked at learning from a systemic perspective. In his description of cybernetic 
system learning Peter van der Knaap (1995) refers to, among others: Deutsch (1966), Argyris & 
Schön (1978), Senge (1992), Ashby (1952), and Fiol & Lyles (1985). According to these authors, a 
cybernetic system has a specific purpose (e.g. the provision of water). To perform its function, a 
system needs inputs (e.g. spring water) from its environment, which it subsequently processes 
into certain outputs (e.g. drinking water and waste). The main principle guiding the cybernetic 
system perspective, however, is this: the self-steering part of a system is able to detect and correct 
error; if a system is capable of obtaining feedback information about the outcomes and 
effectiveness of its actions, it is capable of correcting its errors and improving its overall 
functioning (Van der Knaap, 1995). 
Thus, from the perspective of cybernetic systems, learning refers to the detection and correction 
of error. At least two levels of learning can be distinguished. Many authors have made this 
distinction, using different labels. However, the labels used by Argyris and Schön are probably the 
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most influential. They differentiate between single-loop and double-loop learning (Argyris & 
Schön, 1978). 
Upon the detection of an error, most people look for another operational strategy that will work 
within the same goal-structure and rule-boundaries. This is single-loop learning. Single-loop 
learning occurs on the basis of goal-seeking or confirmatory feedback. This kind of feedback does 
not challenge the purpose of the system: goals, beliefs, values and conceptual frameworks (‘the 
governing values’) are taken for granted without critical reflection. The emphasis is on ‘techniques 
and making techniques more efficient’ (Usher and Bryant, 1989, p. 87 – in Smith, 2013). Questions 
that may be asked are: Could we do what we are currently doing in more productive ways, doing 
it cheaper, using alternative methods or approaches for the same objectives? If an action we take 
yields results that are different to what we expected, through single-loop learning, we will observe 
the results, automatically take in feedback, and try a different approach. This kind of learning may 
lead to the gradual improvement of existing, well-known policies. It solves problems but ignores 
the question of why the problem arose in the first place (Van der Knaap, 1995; Fiol & Lyles, 1985; 
Argyris & Schön, 1978). 
Figure 1: Single & double loop learning
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If we look deeper, however, we may find that what went wrong, did so because of the way the 
system is designed. Consequently, if we change the system’s underlying norms and assumptions, 
we may be able to prevent the error from happening again. An alternative and more sophisticated 
response, therefore, is to question the governing variables themselves, to subject them to critical 
reflection. This is described by Argyris and Schön as double-loop learning. Double-loop learning 
occurs on the basis of goal-changing or innovative feedback. It pertains to the detection and 
correction of errors in ways that involve the modification of an organization’s underlying norms, 
assumptions, policies and objectives. It may lead to discontinuous change and innovation (Van der 
Knaap, 1995; Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Argyris & Schön, 1978). 
We may, however, reflect even further. We can reflect about what prevented us from seeing that 
the system needed changing, before something went wrong. Argyris and Schön call this third level 
of learning ‘deutero learning’. It entails an institutionalized capacity to learn (Argyris & Schön, 
1978; Bovens, Schillemans & ‘t Hart, 2008). 
2.2 Social learning 
The development of mental models and cognitive schemata by individuals does not occur in a 
social vacuum. The individual’s cognitive development is influenced by its social environment. 
Studied from a social perspective, learning depends on communication. On the basis of shared 
linguistic notions, people can exchange knowledge and beliefs. When communication is durable, 
a dialogue or a debate may arise. In a dialectic connection, opinions may be tested and verified, 
alternative viewpoints may be confronted, and mutual efforts of persuasion and argumentation 
may be made. In this way, the individuals participating in the dialectic connection are stimulated 
to reflect on their existing cognitive schemata, which may lead to learning and change (Van der 
Knaap, 1995). 
More still, the confrontation of viewpoints may lead to new viewpoints, transcending the 
opposition. Indeed, the confrontation of competing theses may result in a dialectical process 
through which a synthesis may be reached on a higher level (Bekkers et al., 2011). 
However, the possibilities of communication, dialogue, confrontation of viewpoints, and learning 
may be compromised by what Argyris (Argyris, 1987 – in Van der Knaap, 1995) has called 
‘defensive routines’. Indeed, in order to prevent the experience of embarrassment or threat, 
people tend to take refuge in defensive routines, which are concealing practices to obstruct the 
confrontation of viewpoints (Van der Knaap, 1995). When people feel threatened or vulnerable, 
they often engage in these kinds of defensive routines in order to protect themselves and their 
colleagues from losing face (Morgan, 2006b).  
2.3 Organizational learning 
The notion of organizational learning has received ample scholarly attention over the last couple 
of decades. However, no theory or model of organizational learning has gained widespread 
acceptance (Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Mariotti, 2012). The term ‘organizational learning’ is defined in 
any number of ways, widely differing in scope and focus. Whilst some definitions focus on the 
learning of individuals in the organizational context, others on the opposite side of the spectrum 
instead focus on an organization-level process that is distinct from individual learning. In the 
case of the latter, organizational learning is directly linked to the institutionalization (Knight, 
2002; Huysman, 1999) of such concepts as organizational culture, processes and procedures. 
9 
 
Some scholars argue that organizations cannot learn; that only individuals can learn. For example, 
Weick (1991, p. 119 – in Mariotti, 2012, p. 216) states that “organizations are not built to learn. 
Instead, they are patterns of means-ends relations deliberately designed to make the same routine 
response to different stimuli, a pattern which is antithetical to learning in a traditional sense.” 
Simon (1991, p. 125 – in Knight, 2002, p. 432) states that “all learning takes place inside individual 
human heads.” Nevertheless, Simon argues that 
“what an individual learns in an organization is very much dependent on what is already 
known to (or believed by) other members of the organization and what kinds of 
information are present in the organizational environment. […] human learning in the 
context of an organization is very much influenced by the organization, has 
consequences for the organization and produces phenomena at the organizational level 
that go beyond anything we could infer simply by observing learning processes in 
isolated individuals” (Simon, 1991, p. 125-126, in Mariotti, 2012, p. 216). 
In other words, Simon, and other scholars sharing this view, believe that the notion of 
organizational learning deserves scholarly attention. However, they do not see organizational 
learning as the learning of an organization. They see it as the learning of individuals in an 
organizational context (Crossan et al., 1995). In this view, organizational learning is seen as the 
sum of the learning of individual members of the organization (Mariotti, 2012; Knight, 2002). 
Other scholars, however, consider organizational learning to be more than the sum of the learning 
of individuals that constitute the organization. They argue that not only individuals can learn, but 
organizations as well. For example, Knight (2002, p. 436) argues “that learning is a notion that can 
be usefully applied at different levels, provided we accept that the detailed conceptualization of 
learning and associated constructs, such as memory, are not identical across the levels.” We might, 
for example, make the following comparison: Individuals develop mental models that they use as 
frames of reference to perceive and understand situations and to decide on which courses of 
action to take. Similarly, organizations develop shared mental models which have an influence on 
the decisions made by the management, and which guide the problem-solving activities and 
patterns of interaction among co-workers (Lam, 2006). Hedberg (1981, p. 6) draws another 
parallel: “Organizations do not have brains, but they have cognitive systems and memories.” Lam 
(2006) defines the collective memory of an organization as “the accumulated knowledge of the 
organization, stored in its rules, procedures, routines, and shared norms” (Lam, 2006, p. 124). 
In this view, organizational learning does not only comprise individuals learning in an 
organizational context, but also the organization learning through intra-organizational 
interaction. Identifying organizational learning, however, is tricky business. One tool which 
enables us to see if organization learning has taken place, is analysing whether cognitive 
structures and behavioural patterns remain despite personnel turnover (Knight, 2002). Hedberg 
(1981, p. 6) puts it this way: “Members come and go, and leadership changes, but organizations’ 
memories preserve certain behaviours, mental maps, norms, and values over time.” 
In short, organizational learning is a popular research topic. However, there is no scientific 
agreement on what constitutes organizational learning. In particular, the topic seems to suffer 
from two ailments: disagreement about the appropriate unit of analysis, and definitional 
confusion between the locus of the learning and the context of the learning. This makes any 
scientific discussion difficult. However, Knight (2002) has developed a matrix that might 
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overcome these disagreements. By making the distinction between learner and learning context, 
the matrix distinguishes conceptually different forms of learning. The rows consist of the various 
agents of learning (i.e. each row represents a different learner). The columns regard the context 
for learning. The matrix is an analytical framework that provides the opportunity to map prior 
research, and consequently, to make the conceptual disagreements discussable (Knight, 2002). 
Figure 2: Knight’s (2002) organizational learning-matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Knight, 2002, 438 
On the basis of this framework, we can map the rival conceptions of organizational learning that 
we discussed in the previous paragraph. In this study, we will regard organizational learning as 
the combination of individuals and groups learning in an organizational context, and the 
organization learning through intra-organizational interaction. 
2.3.1 Organizational learning is a social affair 
Starting from this definition, organizational learning can be regarded as a social accomplishment, 
emergent from the interactions of organizational actors. Organizational learning takes place in 
networks of relationships between individuals, groups, and organizational actors. It is a collective 
accomplishment (Mariotti, 2012). According to this view, organizational learning is situated in the 
relational activities of actors: social processes are crucial in the formation of collective cognition 
and knowledge structures; social interactions and group dynamics within organizations are 
decisive factors in the shaping of collective intelligence, learning, and knowledge generation (Lam, 
2006). Organizations are seen as consisting of groups of individuals that collectively try to make 
sense of a complex reality in their daily work activities (Brown & Duguid, 1991). 
2.3.2 Exploitation, exploration and organizational survival 
Scholars in the research area of organizational learning have also examined how shared 
interpretative schemes affect the adaptive potential of organizations. According to Lam (2006), 
some scholars have claimed that collective mental models facilitate an organization’s capacity to 
process and interpret information in a coherent and purposeful manner, and to share knowledge. 
In this manner, shared mental models are expected to aide learning and joint problem solving and, 
hence, to enhance the adaptiveness of organizations (Lam, 2006). 
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However, as Lam (2006) indicates, other scholars have argued that shared mental models can 
create “blind spots” in organizational decision making and impede organizational change. They 
argue that organizations tend to persist in what they do because everyone in the organization has 
the same set of beliefs and values, and because it occurs to no one to question the existing ways of 
doing things. As a consequence, organizations may find it difficult to unlearn these deeply rooted 
practices and to explore alternative ways of doing things (Lam, 2006). 
Therefore, these authors suggest that there should be a sound balance between the exploitation 
of existing knowledge and competences, on the one hand, and the exploration/integration/ 
insertion of new ideas, knowledge, expertise and competences from outside the organization, on 
the other. 
Exploitation, according to Holmqvist (2003, p. 99) refers to the refinement of existing 
organizational knowledge and capabilities. Exploitation is about creating reliability in experience. 
It means productivity, refinement, routinisation, production, and elaboration of existing 
experiences. The exploitation of existing knowledge and competences may enable organizations 
to recombine existing knowledge and generate new applications from its existing knowledge base. 
This will most likely result in cumulative learning, which is continuous but incremental (Lam, 
2006). At the same time, however, these learning processes can also result in a “simple-
mindedness and a concomitant inability to explore new opportunities” (Holmqvist, 2003, p. 99). 
These drawbacks, caused by exploitation, will need counteraction. Organizations will need to 
create variety in their experiences as well, by experimenting, innovating and taking risks. This is 
the so-called process of exploration (Holmqvist, 2003). The inflow of new knowledge and ideas 
may enable organizations to generate radical new products and processes. Sources from outside 
the organization are often thought to be in a better position to challenge existing perspectives and 
paradigms (Lam, 2006). In addition, Foldy (2004) argues that cultural diversity in an 
organization’s workforce enhances organizational performance. Indeed, alternative and new 
ideas and perspectives can be generated by culturally heterogeneous groups, who contribute to 
functional diversity. 
In the literature, a binary divide is made between intra-organizational learning processes on the 
one hand, and inter-organizational learning processes on the other. Where the former process 
favours exploitation, the latter favours exploration. The reason for this division may be found in 
the presence or absence of a dominant group. Intra-organizational learning is typically controlled 
by a dominant group, which has the power to select, promote, demote and dismiss organizational 
members. This situation tends to result in a status quo of organizational worldviews, norms, 
traditions, and rules (Holmqvist, 2003). 
Inter-organizational learning, on the other hand, has been claimed to be of a highly innovative and 
explorative character, because this type of learning has the potential to share somewhat different 
experiences between the learning entities (Holmqvist, 2003). Inter-organizational collaborations 
may enable formal organizations “to increase their store of knowledge not previously available 
within the organization” (Huber, 1991, p. 97 – in Holmqvist, 2003, p. 104). They provide “a 
shortcut to radical change, by-passing organizational vicious circles and deadlocks” (Ciborra, 
1991, p. 59 – in Holmqvist, 2003, p. 104). 
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2.3.3 Tacit and explicit knowledge, knowledge conversion, and knowledge 
management 
Knowledge management lies somewhat outside the field of organizational learning itself, but is 
very closely connected to it and critical for how organizational learning can operate. Knowledge 
management is the set of processes and practices by which knowledge is recognized, acquired, 
captured, codified, recorded, stored, aggregated, communicated, shared, transferred, converted, 
retrieved and reaccessed (Rashman et al., 2005; Gilson, Dunleavy & Tinkler, 2009; Levitt & March, 
1988). 
Before we can elaborate on this, we need to discuss the conceptual distinction made, among 
others, by Polanyi (1966) and Nonaka (1994) between tacit and explicit knowledge (Hartley & 
Allison, 2002; Rashman et al., 2005). Explicit knowledge can be articulated, codified and 
transmitted using formal systems (e.g. language and mathematics) and captured in language-
based records (such as those in libraries, archives and databases). Tacit knowledge is personal, 
contextual, and often embedded in practice (concrete know-how, crafts and skills that apply to 
specific contexts), making it difficult to articulate and harder to share through formal language 
systems. The transfer of knowledge is dependent on close social interaction (Hartley & Allison, 
2002; Rashman et al., 2005). 
Hartley & Allison (2002) give us four modes of knowledge conversion through which tacit and 
explicit knowledge can be created and transferred between individuals and groups: 
- Socialization is the process of converting tacit knowledge (known by one person or 
group) to tacit knowledge (held by another person or group). It is a process of sharing 
experiences and thereby sharing tacit knowledge, such as shared mental models and 
technical skills. It includes the processes of observation and imitation. 
- Externalization is the process of articulating tacit knowledge into explicit concepts and 
ideas. The conversion process can be enhanced through dialogue and reflection. The use 
of metaphors and analogies, the telling of stories and anecdotes, the contrasting of 
situations and contexts can help explicit concepts to emerge from tacit knowledge. 
- Combination is the process of systematizing concepts into a knowledge system and it 
occurs through combining and converting different forms of explicit knowledge. Such 
knowledge can be diffused and learnt (at least in its explicit form) through reconfiguring 
existing information, analysing, combining and recategorizing. Databases are an example 
of the combination of explicit knowledge. 
- Internalization is the process of converting explicit to tacit knowledge. This process 
tends to be achieved through practice, by simply ‘having a go at it’. Manuals and other 
documentation of, for example, project evaluation can help to embed tacit knowledge, 
however, the ‘embodiment’ of knowledge through action is critical. 
 
Both tacit and explicit knowledge are crucial for the functioning of an organization. Routine-based 
conceptions of learning presume that practical knowledge, whether in implicit form or in formal 
rules, is recorded, maintained and accumulated in an organizational memory through rules, 
procedures, routines, and shared norms. The biggest obstacle for this documentation to happen 
efficiently and effectively is the turnover of personnel and passage of time (Levitt & March, 1988). 
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Figure 3: Tacit and explicit knowledge conversion  
 
Source: Hartley & Allison, 2002, 105 (adapted from Nonaka, 1994, 19) 
 
Unfortunately, the conversion of tacit knowledge known by one person or group to tacit 
knowledge held by another person or group (socialization) is often resource-intensive, slow and 
individualized. Fast-changing environments can be problematic for such a pace of learning in 
organizations (Gilson, Dunleavy & Tinkler, 2009; Hartley & Allison, 2002). Consequently, the 
question of how knowledge can be more formally collected and stored in retrievable ways by and 
within organizations has attracted widespread attention. 
2.3.4 Organizational learning as a combination of cognition and behaviour 
In an effort to synthesize previous models and theories of organizational learning, Fiol and Lyles 
(1985) suggest that “learning is the development of insights, knowledge, and associations 
between past actions, the effectiveness of those actions, and future actions” (Fiol & Lyles, 1985, 
811). More precisely, they conceive learning as a dynamic relationship between cognitive and 
behavioural development (see also: Crossan et al., 1995). 
With the cognitive dimension of learning, Fiol and Lyles refer to the development of insights and 
cognitive associations, and to changes in the states of knowledge of organizations. Insights and 
causal associations are developed via the filtering, interpretation, and processing of raw 
information about past actions and performance. This information is thus translated into concrete 
lessons for the future, lessons concerning causes of and possible solutions to problems (Dekker & 
Hansén, 2004). The behavioural dimension comprises changes in terms of behavioural and 
organizational outcomes. Not just any change however. It refers particularly to those adaptations 
that reflect the knowledge, insights and cognitive associations that have been developed (Fiol & 
Lyles, 1985). It refers to the institutionalization of the lessons learned. 
It should be noted, however, that learning is not a set, linear process in which behavioural change 
is always preceded by cognitive developments and in which cognitive developments are always 
followed by behavioural changes (Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Dekker & Hansén, 2004). This means two 
things. First, new insights and ideas are not always turned into new practices. Assessments may 
be challenged, what is learned may be ignored, or the pressures on the system may not be 
sufficient to bring about changes (Aucoin & Heintzman, 2000). Second, changes in behaviour may 
occur without any preceding cognitive development. However, those behavioural changes may 
sometimes give rise to a growing awareness about the effectiveness of those changes. To put it in 
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the words of Crossan, Lane and White: ‘‘understanding guides action, but action also informs 
understanding’’ (Crossan, Lane & White, 1999, 524). 
2.4 Enabling factors for public sector learning 
It is important to understand the major factors that can enable organizational learning and the 
ones that can inhibit it. Numerous factors have been identified by the literature as potential 
enablers/inhibitors of organizational and inter-organizational learning. In Table 1 a selection of 
factors is provided. This selection is an adaptation of and addition to the typology of factors 
developed by Greiling & Halachmi (2013). Greiling & Halachmi, in their turn, based their typology 
on the work of Popper & Lipshitz (2000); Barrados & Mayne (2003); Friedman, Lipshitz & 
Overmeer (2003); Rashman, Withers & Hartley (2009). 
Table 1: Factors enabling organizational learning 
Environmental enablers 
(external to the learning 
entity) 
Environmental uncertainty 
Amount of competition 
Amount of (public) pressure for innovation and modernization 
Regulatory obligations 
Legal constraints and ethical issues 
Costs and salience of potential errors 
Political enablers Top management endorsement and commitment to organizational learning 
Top management inducement of organizational learning culture 
Strategic thinking 
Cultural enablers 
(organizational learning 
values/culture) 
Transparency: honest and unbiased information disclosure 
Integrity and issue orientation: collecting and providing information and 
making judgments regardless of its implications, regardless of interests, status, 
personal likes, etc. 
General openness that encourages questioning, inquiry and constructive 
criticism 
Openness for feedback information, for alternative opinions and perspectives 
Tolerance for uncertainty: allowing cognitive dissonance 
Tolerance for errors Sense of safety about making errors and 
discussing them openly 
No-blame culture, trust-based culture 
Egalitarianism: power-sharing, participation, equal responsibility for 
performance, regardless of formal status (cf. TQM) 
Institutional learning 
conditions: structural and 
procedural arrangements 
that allow organizations 
to collect, analyse, store, 
disseminate and use 
Credible measurement and 
analysis 
Deliberate measurement practices: active 
measurement of a wide spectrum of 
performance 
Useful analysis 
Data quality assurance practices 
Information dissemination: widespread and timely communication of result 
information, in useful formats 
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information and 
knowledge 
Regular review Practices for routine review of accomplishments 
Procedures for follow-up of decisions taken 
Internal platforms, arenas, forums to discuss and debate 
Knowledge management Making tacit knowledge explicit 
Recording, conservation and retrieval of 
knowledge and experience 
Creating, acquiring, capturing, aggregating, 
codifying, sharing and using knowledge 
 Organizational memory Archives 
Documentation of procedures 
Organizational structure Bureaucratic structure – adhocracy – J-form 
Degree of autonomy/Distance from politics: Department – central agency – 
more autonomous agency 
Organizational capacity Organizational slack (people, money, time, competences, information, 
knowledge, political support, contacts) 
Large variety of relevant skills and knowledge that can be exploited 
Personnel turnover 
 Systems, feedback, and environment 
Open vs. closed systems 
In “An outline of general system theory”, Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1950) makes the fundamental 
distinction between open and closed systems: 
“We call a system closed when no materials enter or leave it. It is open if there is inflow and 
outflow, and therefore change of the component materials” (von Bertalanffy, 1950, p. 155). 
According to von Bertalanffy, the conception of an open system is more general than that of a 
closed system. Indeed, one can conceive a closed system as an open system in which the transport 
terms have been equated to zero. The opposite, however, is not possible (von Bertalanffy, 1950). 
Closed systems are stationary. They are in a state of equilibrium, which means that their 
composition remains constant throughout time. An open system on the other hand, may attain a 
stationary state, but only if certain conditions are met. If this is the case, the composition of the 
system is not constant. The system appears to be constant, but this steady state is maintained by 
a continuous exchange of materials with the environment (von Bertalanffy, 1950). 
Many biological and social systems can be characterized as open systems, while many physical 
and mechanical systems can be characterized as closed systems. However, the distinction 
between open and closed systems is not a dichotomous one, it is a continuous one. Indeed, the 
degree of openness can vary. For example, some open systems may be responsive only to a 
relatively narrow range of inputs from the environment (Morgan, 2006a). 
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3.1 The “open systems approach” to organization: the organism metaphor 
Introduction 
The open systems approach is based on the principle that organizations are, just like biological 
organisms, open to their environment and that – in order to survive – they must achieve an 
appropriate relation with that environment; they must interact with it and they must adapt to it. 
A closed system, by contrast, is not dependent on its environment. It is autonomous, insulated, 
and sealed off from its environment (Morgan, 2006a; Katz & Kahn, 1978; Daft, 1995). 
In more traditional management and organizational theories and studies, relatively little attention 
was given to the environment. Organizations were predominantly viewed and treated as closed 
mechanical systems. The environment was assumed to be stable and predictable and not to 
interfere with the functioning of the system. Attention was focused on principles of internal design 
with a focus on effectiveness and efficiency (Morgan, 2006a; Katz & Kahn, 1978; Daft, 1995).  
In other words, the closed-system approach ignored the importance of the environment to the 
functioning of human organizations. It was preoccupied with principles of internal design and 
internal organizational functioning. Consequently, it failed to understand the processes of 
feedback which are essential to survival (Morgan, 2006a; Katz & Kahn, 1978; Daft, 1995). 
In the open systems approach, much attention is devoted to the relationship between the 
organization and its environment. A dominant principle is that organizations have to adapt 
themselves to their environments if they are to survive. Organizations have to align with their 
environments to remain competitive and innovative. Alignment implies that the firm must have 
the potential to learn, unlearn or relearn based on its past behaviours. It can be argued that 
organizational adaptation is the essence of strategic management: when it comes to dealing with 
changes occurring in the environment, Fiol & Lyles (1985) stress that this should be the key focus, 
and that it involves the continuous process of making strategic choices (Fiol & Lyles, 1985). 
The principle of organizational adaptation is also reflected in contingency theory. This theoretical 
current asserts that there is no one ideal way of organizing. The appropriate form depends on the 
kind of task or environment with which one is dealing (Morgan, 2006a). 
The concept of an open system 
An open or organic system is continuously engaged in an exchange of materials and/or energy 
with its environment. This interaction is crucial for the survival of the system, and for maintaining 
the so-called steady state. The open system is, more precisely, engaged in a continuous cycle of 
input, internal transformation (throughput), output, and feedback: inputs from the environment 
(materials and/or energy) are transformed into some product, which is then exported into the 
environment, after which the system recharges itself with sources in the environment (Morgan, 
2006a; Katz & Kahn, 1978). 
Open systems share a number of characteristics: negative entropy, feedback, homeostasis, 
requisite variety and equifinality. (1) Closed systems are entropic. This means that they have an 
irreversible tendency to degenerate and decay. Open systems, on the other hand, try to counter 
these entropic tendencies by importing energy from their environments. The law of negative 
entropy posits that systems survive and maintain their steady states as long as they import more 
energy from the environment than they consume (Morgan, 2006a; Katz & Kahn, 1978). (2) The 
feedback principle has to do with information input, which is a kind of signal to the system about 
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environmental conditions and about the functioning of the system in relation to its environment. 
Such information constitutes feedback, which enables the system to correct for its own errors or 
for changes in the environment, and thus to maintain a steady state or homeostasis. (3) The 
concept of homeostasis refers to the self-regulating processes through which the inflow and 
outflow of materials and energy in organic systems is kept in balance. In other words, it refers to 
the ability to maintain a steady state (the ability to maintain life and form). These processes 
operate on the basis of negative feedback, implying that deviations from a certain set standard 
initiate corrective actions aimed at reducing the deviation (Morgan, 2006a; von Bertalanffy, 1950; 
Katz & Kahn, 1978). (4) The principle of requisite variety asserts that – in order to be adequate 
and appropriate – the internal regulatory mechanisms of a system must be as complex and diverse 
as the environment with which it has to deal (Morgan, 2006a, 2006b). (5) The principle of 
equifinality builds on the idea that an open system can arrive at the same end state from different 
initial conditions, with different resources, and by different paths of development (Morgan, 
2006a; Katz & Kahn, 1978). 
Open systems are also regularly characterized in terms of interrelated subsystems. For example, 
an organization can be anatomized into organizational divisions, which in their turn, consist of 
smaller groups or departments, each of which contains individual human beings. If we interpret 
the whole organization as the system, then the other levels can be understood as subsystems, 
knowing that each subsystem in itself can be perceived as a complex open system in its own right 
(Morgan, 2006a). 
The organization as an open system 
Figure 5 is a schematic representation of an open system. In the context of public sector 
organizations, the inputs include raw materials, human resources, information and financial 
resources. In the transformation process, these inputs are transformed into something of value 
which can be exported back to the environment. In the context of public sector organizations, 
examples of valuable outputs are products and services for citizens and customers. Apart from 
valuable outputs, the transformation process can also create and export undesired by-products 
such as pollution to the environment (Daft, 1995).  
An organization is composed of several subsystems. The specific functions required for 
organizational survival are performed by several interrelated subsystems. In an organization, 
these subsystems may be called departments. Daft distinguishes between five essential functions 
which can be performed by organizational subsystems: 
- Boundary spanning: boundary spanning subsystems are responsible for exchanges with 
the environment; they handle input and output transactions; 
- Production: the production subsystem is responsible for the transformation process; 
- Maintenance: the maintenance subsystem provides supportive functions that enable the 
organization to run smoothly; examples are the personnel department and the janitorial 
staff; 
- Adaption: the adaptive subsystem is responsible for organizational change, adaptation 
and innovation; in order to do this, it scans the environment for problems and 
opportunities; 
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- Management: the management subsystem is responsible for providing direction, 
coordination, strategy and goals for the other subsystems. 
Figure 4: Open System  
 
Source: Daft, 1995, 12 
These subsystems are interconnected and often overlap. Departments may have multiple roles 
(Daft, 1995). 
Structural contingency theory  
General 
According to Lam (2006), the classical theory of organizational design assumed the idea of ‘one 
best way to organize’. This assumption was challenged by the contingency theory, which came to 
prominence during the 1960s and 1970s. Contingency theory argues that the most suitable 
structure for an organization is the one that best fits the relevant contingencies, such as the nature 
of the task or the environment with which the organization is dealing. Consequently, contingency 
theory is preoccupied with investigating the links between the nature of the task, the 
environment, structures and organizational performance (Lam, 2006; Morgan, 2006a.). Following 
Lam (2006), we discuss two important early contributions to contingency theory. 
A study of Burns & Stalker (1961) found that firms could be categorized in two main types: 
‘mechanistic’ and ‘organic’ organizations. Mechanistic organizations are typically rigid and 
hierarchical. They are characterized by: task specialization and functionally differentiated duties; 
precise definition of rights and obligations; a hierarchical structure of control, authority and 
communication; concentration of knowledge at the top of the organization. The study of Burns & 
Stalker found that this type of organization is well suited to stable and predictable conditions. 
Organic organizations, on the other hand, are typically more fluid in their structures and 
procedures. They are characterized by: continual adjustment and redefinition of individual tasks 
and duties; a network structure of control, authority and communication; knowledge may be 
located anywhere in the network. This type of organization is said to be better suited for 
environments characterized by rapid change and high complexity (Lam, 2006). 
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In 1979, Mintzberg proposed a series of organizational archetypes: simple structure, machine 
bureaucracy, professional bureaucracy, divisionalised form, and adhocracy. He argued that 
successful organizations design their structures to accommodate their environments. According 
to Mintzberg, bureaucratic structures work well within stable environments, but are not 
innovative and cannot cope with novelty or change in the environment. Adhocracies, by contrast, 
are highly organic and flexible forms of organization and are capable of radical innovation in a 
volatile environment (Lam, 2006). 
Structural contingency theory and innovation 
At the centre of contingency theory is the notion of ‘fit’. The theory asserts that an appropriate fit 
between organizational structure and key contingencies will lead to higher performance. 
Innovation may assist at achieving this fit by adapting structures to new circumstances. Figure 6 
shows Donaldson’s (2001) ‘structural adaptation to regain fit’ model, edited by Walker (2013) to 
include innovation. 
Figure 5: ‘Structural adaptation to regain fit’-model 
 
Source: Walker, 2013, 18 
In accordance with structural contingency theory, the figure suggests that the fit or misfit between 
organizational structure and contingency influences the level of performance. When key 
contingencies change while the organizational structure remains unchanged, this will result in 
misfit, which may lead to reduced levels of performance. In order to restore performance back to 
acceptable levels, the organization has to adapt: it has to change its structure in order to 
accommodate the changed contingencies and to bring the organization back into fit (Walker, 
2013). 
The basic dynamics of search and change 
According to Downs (1967), organizational change is closely related with information seeking. He 
sets forth a basic model of search and change for both individuals and organizations. For our 
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purposes, we will focus on the level of the organization. The basic model is a theory of dynamic 
equilibrium involving the following hypotheses: 
- All organizations are continuously engaged in scanning their immediate environment to 
some degree. They constantly receive a certain amount of information from their 
environments. This stream of information comes to them without specific effort on their 
part to obtain it. This constitutes a minimal degree of constant, ‘automatic’ search. 
- Each organization sets a level of performance it aspires to achieve. Organizations can 
choose different aspiration levels. A wide range of internal and external pressures will 
play a role in determining the aspiration level. 
- Whenever the performance level of the organization drops below the aspiration level, the 
organization will be motivated to search more intensively for alternative ways of 
organizing its business. Indeed, the perceived performance gap creates dissatisfaction, 
which incites the organization to intensify its normal search and to direct it specifically at 
alternatives likely to close the performance gap. Other things being equal, the organization 
will select the alternative that involves the least profound change in its structure. 
- Once the organization has adopted a new course of action, enabling it to regain or surpass 
its original performance level, it will reduce its search efforts back to their normal, 
automatic degree of intensity. 
- If the intensified search fails to reveal any ways the organization can return to its original 
level of performance, the organization will eventually adjust its aspiration level 
downwards, to the highest level of performance it can attain. 
- When an organization is achieving its aspiration level, it is in a state of equilibrium. The 
organization is maximizing its utility in the light of its existing knowledge. The 
organization is not motivated to search for alternative ways to organize its business. 
- There is only one exception, namely when the constant, automatic search process by 
chance reveals an alternative that might allow the organization to move to an even higher 
level of performance. This possibility creates a potential performance gap and motivates 
the organization to explore this alternative. If the intensified search reveals that the 
organization can indeed improve its performance by shifting to the alternative, the 
organization will make the shift. Once the organization has adopted the new course of 
action, the new higher performance level will be regarded as the aspiration level. 
3.2 Autopoiesis and the (relatively) closed nature of systems 
Introduction 
The idea of an organization as an open system which is in constant interaction with its 
environment, was challenged by the theory of autopoiesis. The term autopoiesis was introduced 
by two biologists, Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela (Arnoldi, 2006). They posit that all 
living systems are closed, autonomous, and insulated, and make reference only to themselves. The 
ultimate aim of these systems is to (re)produce themselves (Morgan, 2006c). Although Maturana 
and Varela have strong reservations about applying the theory of autopoiesis to the social world, 
their work has had a profound influence on social and organizational studies. 
The body of literature about organizations devotes considerable attention to the boundaries of 
organizations. Organizations have boundaries which are easily or less easily penetrable. This 
permeability may refer to the entry and exit of persons, but more often it refers to the receptivity 
of the organization towards signals from the environment (de Bruijn & ten Heuvelhof, 1991). 
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Receiving and filtering information from the environment 
Each organization has a management or perception filter that receives and filters signals from the 
environment. Open systems have a rather thin filter, allowing many external signals to enter the 
organization, while closed or autopoietic systems have a very thick filter, allowing only a limited 
amount of external signals to penetrate into the organization. More precisely, signals from the 
environment will only be perceived by an autopoietic organization when they relate to the 
internal frame of reference of the organization. In other words, autopoietic systems are not 
oriented towards their environments, they are oriented towards themselves. They make 
reference only to themselves. They respond only to impulses which are consistent with their own 
frames of reference (de Bruijn & ten Heuvelhof, 1991). Easton (1965) denoted this tendency of 
self-referral and relative closedness as an orientation towards withinputs, instead of towards 
inputs and feedback from the environment. 
Katz & Kahn (1978) denote this process as the coding process: “Any system that is the recipient 
of information, […] has a characteristic coding process, a limited set of coding categories to which 
it assimilates the information received” (Katz & Kahn, 1978, p. 433). These coding categories 
determine which types of information will be selected as relevant and how they will be perceived, 
interpreted and transformed. 
Thus, organizations have their own filters and coding systems that determine the amount and 
types of information they receive from their environment and the way the information will be 
perceived. However, within the organization, the different subsystems with their different 
functions will also have their own, (slightly) different frames of reference and ways of thinking. 
Therefore, each subsystem will respond to the same information in different ways. Consequently, 
within an organization, there may be problems of communication and interpretation between 
subsystems (Katz & Kahn, 1978). 
Advantages of relative closedness 
According to the open systems approach, organizational closedness is detrimental to the survival 
odds of the organization. Indeed, the open system approach asserts that, in order to survive, an 
organization has to adapt itself to its environment. However, as de Bruijn & ten Heuvelhof (1991) 
indicate, relative closedness can have advantages as well. Being in a state of relative closedness 
allows an organization to shield itself from excessive turbulence and complexity from its 
environment, and to reduce the insecurity associated with it. Without this kind of shielding, the 
organization would react to every single impulse. The resulting overload could cause the 
organization to drift or even to disintegrate (de Bruijn & ten Heuvelhof, 1991). 
Similarly, unrestricted communication between the subsystems of an organization may produce 
noise and overload in the system. An organized state of affairs may require the introduction of 
constraints and restrictions to reduce random and diffuse communication between subsystems 
(Katz & Kahn, 1978). Thelen (quoted in Katz & Kahn, 1978, p. 430-431) summarizes Ashby (1952) 
to make this point: “Stability of the suprasystem would take infinitely long to achieve if there were 
‘full and rich communication’ among the subsystems […]. If communication among subsystems is 
restricted or if they are temporarily isolated, then each subsystem achieves its own stability with 
minimum interference by the changing environment of other systems seeking their stability.” 
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Alteration of opening up and closing off 
The degree of closedness/openness of an organization is not necessarily static. It can fluctuate 
during the life course of the organization. For the purpose of innovation or adaptation, an 
organization may choose to be relatively open for a while in order to take in new information from 
its environment. In the aftermath, the organization may require a period of relative closedness in 
order to reduce the level of uncertainty. In this view, a periodic alternation of opening up and 
closing off may be seen as healthy for an organization (de Bruijn & ten Heuvelhof, 1991). 
3.3 Feedback 
In “An outline of general system theory”, Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1950) defines feedback as 
follows: 
“Feed-back means that from the output of a machine a certain amount is monitored back, as 
‘information’, to the input so as to regulate the latter and thus to stabilize or direct the action 
of the machine” (von Bertalanffy, 1950, p.159-160). 
Cybernetic models of self-regulation 
The term ‘cybernetics’ was first used in the 1940s by MIT mathematician Norbert Wiener. The 
term is used to refer to processes of information exchange, including in particular negative 
feedback, which enables systems (such as machines and organisms) to self-regulate their 
behaviour and to maintain a steady state. The concept of negative feedback is closely related to 
the detection and correction of error: when a system exceeds certain specified limits, it will 
automatically initiate corrective action to maintain a desired outcome (Morgan, 2006b). 
Most cybernetic models of self-regulation are driven by the philosophy of a dual process system 
which involves a higher order mechanism that monitors and controls a lower order mechanism. 
We can illustrate this by referring to the functioning of a thermostat. The thermostat (the higher 
order) mechanism, monitors the temperature in a room and is programmed to initiate a heating 
mechanism (the lower order mechanism), if and when the temperature drops below a set lower 
limit, and to stop the heating mechanism if and when the temperature rises above a set upper limit 
(Wang & Mukhopadhyay, 2012). 
Thus, according to Morgan (2006b), any cybernetic system is based on four key principles: 
1. The capacity to monitor significant aspects of the environment 
2. The ability to relate this information to the operating norms/standards/reference 
values 
3. The ability to detect significant discrepancies between the current state and the norm 
4. The ability to initiate corrective action in order to reduce the discrepancies 
Similarly, Porter, Lawler & Hackman (1975) (in Katz & Kahn, 1978) specify four basic elements as 
critical: 
1. Standards or specified objectives 
2. Monitoring devices to measure current performance 
3. Comparing devices to compare actual performance with stated objectives 
4. Action devices to reduce possible discrepancies between objectives and actual 
performance 
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The simplest cybernetic systems, such as house thermostats, can only correct deviations from the 
operating norms. They are unable to question the appropriateness of the operating norms 
themselves. More complex cybernetic systems are able to detect and correct errors in the 
operating norms. In other words, they are able to influence the standards that guide their 
behaviour (Morgan, 2006b). It is this kind of self-questioning ability that constitutes the 
fundamental distinction between single-loop and double-loop learning discussed earlier: 
- Single-loop learning: the ability to detect and correct error in relation to a given set of 
operating norms 
- Double-loop learning: the ability to question the relevance and appropriateness of the 
operating norms 
The organizational locus of informational subsystems 
As indicated in previous paragraphs, feedback information about the performance of the system 
in relation to its environment is crucial for the survival of the system and for the upholding of its 
performance levels. According to Katz & Kahn (1978) two questions are crucial. The first question 
is: who gathers the feedback information? Katz & Kahn (1978) make the argument that it is 
important to have a specialized information subsystem which has information gathering as its 
sole or major task. The second question is: to whom should the information be reported? 
The question of a specialized information subsystem 
According to Katz & Kahn (1978), information gathering – especially the gathering of information 
regarding the system as a whole and its relations to the environment – is best assigned to a 
specialized subsystem for which information gathering is its major or its only responsibility. The 
opposite would entail a number of disadvantages. One could, for example, assign the information 
gathering task to an existing substructure, whose primary function is non-informational. 
According to Katz & Kahn (1978), this would be unwise because the primary task of the 
substructure would determine the types of information that would be received and the way they 
would be processed. Moreover, the members of the substructure are not necessarily expert in the 
subject about which information is sought, nor are they necessarily trained in research 
procedures (Katz & Kahn, 1978). 
With a specialized informational subsystem, these problems may be avoided. However, other 
problems may arise. For example, top management directives may hamper the freedom of the 
subsystem and may narrow the receptivity of the subsystem down to only certain types of 
information. To avoid these kinds of dysfunctions, Katz & Kahn (1978) argue that it is necessary 
to grant the information subsystem a number of freedoms, similar to the freedoms a university 
researcher would enjoy. Most notably, top management should not pose specific questions to 
which they expect answers. Indeed, the answers provided could easily be influenced by the 
questions asked (Katz & Kahn, 1978). 
The question of the optimal locus for reporting 
Katz & Kahn (1978) argue that information which has direct relevance for the functioning of the 
system as a whole should be reported to the top echelons of the organization. However, they 
recognize that it is often difficult for top managers to find the time to absorb the information and 
to translate it into adequate decisions (Katz & Kahn, 1978). 
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3.4 Feedback for public sector organizations: typologies 
The source of the feedback 
Feedback information about the performance of an organization may come from 
1. The staff of the organization 
2. The stakeholders of the organization (clients/customers/citizens, partners,…) 
3. Monitoring systems 
4. Actors engaged in policy evaluation 
5. Ombudsmen, audit offices and other (administrative) accountability mechanisms 
The staff of the organization 
There are many ways the staff of an organization can provide feedback information to the 
management of the organization. Staff members may be required to report to their managers 
about what they have done, what their co-workers have done, about their problems and the 
problems of their unit, and about what they think needs to be done to overcome these problems. 
However, since this kind of information is often utilized for control purposes, there are great 
constraints on the free flow of upward communication. Staff members do not tend to give 
information to their managers that might put themselves or their co-workers in a bad light. They 
will only tell the boss what they want the boss to know (Katz & Kahn, 1978). 
It has been argued that the more control is exercised through pressure and sanctions, the less 
adequate the flow of information up the line will be. Indeed, pressure and sanctions make people 
feel threatened or vulnerable. When people feel threatened or vulnerable, they often take refuge 
in defensive routines to protect themselves and their colleagues from losing face. They will try to 
conceal errors and problems because the surfacing of these issues might put them in a bad light. 
They will engage in impression management and window-dressing techniques to make situations 
look better than they actually are. They will fail to report deep-rooted problems (Morgan, 2006b). 
The stakeholders of the organization 
In the private sector, sales and profits are important indicators for the performance of the 
organization. Public sector organizations, however, are often in a monopolistic position. Citizens 
often have no choice but to be clients of the public organization in question. Consequently, the 
market share or the number of provided services is not a good indicator for the performance of 
the organization. A better indicator is the customer’s satisfaction with and appreciation of the 
provided service. Customer satisfaction surveys may provide this type of feedback information. 
But also complaint management systems may provide insight into the areas of satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction of the customers. 
Monitoring systems 
Performance measurement or monitoring refers to the collecting of information about selected 
aspects or factors in the context of policy and management. The process of monitoring has a 
systematic and continuous character. Information is systematically gathered by means of periodic 
measurements. Thus, monitoring can be a permanent source of information for managers and 
policymakers. However, it offers only descriptive information. Monitoring systems can report how 
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well the current operations may be working, but it cannot explain the reasons for the success or 
failure (De Peuter, 2011). 
Katz & Kahn (1978) refer to a particular kind of monitoring, which they label ‘operational 
feedback’. They define operational feedback as “systematic information getting that is closely tied 
to the ongoing functions of the organization and is sometimes an integral part of those functions” 
(Katz & Kahn, 1978, p. 455). For example: keeping record of the number of produced units. This 
kind of information is generated by the operational unit involved and it flows back directly to that 
same unit. The major function of operational feedback is similar to the negative feedback function 
of the higher order mechanisms that keep cybernetic systems on course. In other words, it rings 
alarms when the actual performance deviates from the norm. The major limitation of operational 
feedback is that it can only report on how well the current operations may be working, but it 
cannot explain the reasons for their success or failure (Katz & Kahn, 1978). 
Policy evaluation 
Evaluation can be defined as “the systematic and objective determination of the worth or merit of 
an object” (Scriven, quoted in De Peuter, 2011, 112) or as “a structured process that creates and 
synthesizes information intended to reduce the level of uncertainty for stakeholders about a given 
program or policy. It is intended to answer questions or test hypotheses […]” (McDavid & 
Howthorn, quoted in De Peuter, 2011, 112). 
Thus, unlike monitoring, evaluation is capable of answering how and why questions and of finding 
relations and giving explanations. It possesses specific techniques and approaches to answer 
these kinds of questions (De Peuter, 2011). 
De Peuter (2011) argues that often, monitoring and evaluation are complementary. For example, 
the policy evaluation process may determine which types of information are needed in order to 
answer the questions asked. In these cases, monitoring systems may prove to be important 
sources of information (De Peuter, 2011). 
Whereas monitoring has a systematic and ongoing character, policy evaluations are mostly ad hoc 
events (De Peuter, 2011). 
Ombudsmen reports and (performance) audits 
Just like policy evaluations, ombudsmen reports and performance audits may provide public 
sector organizations with feedback information about important performance dimensions. 
However, there are important differences between policy evaluation on the one hand and 
ombudsmen and audit offices on the other. 
Desomer, Put & Van Loocke (2013) and D’hoedt & Bouckaert (2011) address these differences. 
First and foremost, policy evaluations are generally performed in a client-contractor relationship. 
This has important consequences for the independence of the evaluator. Since most policy 
evaluations are executed at the request of the client (often the government or the administration), 
the evaluator’s independence is often limited by the terms of reference (scope of the research, 
research questions, norms and standards, etc.) formulated by the client. Furthermore, it may be 
harder for the evaluator to obtain access to sensitive documents. Not to forget, the client is the 
owner of the evaluation report and can therefore decide not to make the report accessible to the 
public (D’hoedt & Bouckaert, 2011; Desomer, Put & Van Loocke, 2013). 
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Ombudsmen and audit offices, on the other hand, perform their activities in a context of public 
accountability. More precisely, ombudsmen and audit offices are often charged by a political 
principal (parliament or the government) to exercise some kind of oversight over an agent (the 
government or the administration). They are, so to speak, auxiliary mechanisms to aid political 
principals to oversee their administrative agents (Bovens, 2005a; Bovens, 2005b). The mandates 
of ombudsmen and audit offices are therefore based on the premise of independence. Their 
investigations are performed according to their own frames of reference (scope, research 
questions, norms and standards, etc.), and without the organization under scrutiny asking for it. 
Moreover, their reports are always made public (D’hoedt & Bouckaert, 2011; Desomer, Put & Van 
Loocke, 2013). 
The focus of the feedback 
Goal-seeking feedback vs. goal-changing feedback 
Goal-seeking feedback gives information about the degree to which the stated goals are achieved. 
Goal-seeking feedback is characteristic of single-loop learning. This kind of feedback does not 
challenge the purpose of the system: goals, beliefs, values and conceptual frameworks (‘the 
governing values’) are taken for granted without critical reflection. It may solve problems but 
ignores the question of why the problem arose in the first place. Goal-changing feedback, by 
contrast, does question the appropriateness of the stated goals and the underlying norms and 
assumptions. This kind of feedback is characteristic of double-loop learning and may lead to 
discontinuous change and innovation (Van der Knaap, 1995; Morgan, 2006b). 
Internal vs. external perspective 
The focus of the feedback may be on issues of internal design or on the relationship between the 
organization and the environment. To make this argument more clear, let us introduce Figure 7, 
which depicts the management and policy cycle as an open system model. 
De Peuter (2011) explains the logics of this model: Government is confronted with societal needs. 
In response to these needs, the government articulates policy objectives, both at the strategic and 
the operational level. Public sector organizations are charged with the fulfilment of these 
objectives. In order to do this, the organization needs inputs (raw materials, human resources, 
information and financial resources). In the subsequent transformation process, these inputs are 
transformed into products and services (output). These outputs are exported back into the 
environment. They are intended to have an impact on the societal needs, which were the reason 
for the initiation of the policy initiative (De Peuter, 2011).  
Feedback about the internal design of the organization is preoccupied with techniques and 
making techniques more efficient. Attention is focused on ‘input’, ‘processes’, ‘output’ and their 
interrelationships. Relevant questions are: Could we do what we are currently doing in more 
productive ways, do it cheaper, use alternative methods or approaches for the same objectives? 
Other forms of feedback are more concerned with the functioning of the system in relation to its 
changing environment. Attention will be focused on the societal needs and the societal effects of 
policies. Relevant topics are, among others: the study of environmental trends and needs, the 
impact of the organization and its policies on the environment, including both the intended and 
the usually unanticipated consequences (Katz & Kahn, 1978; De Peuter, 2011). 
Functioning of a subsystem vs. functioning of the total system 
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Some types of feedback focus solely on the functioning of a single subsystem, while others focus 
on the system as a whole and on the interrelationship of the subsystems within the total system. 
A scope which is too limited, may lead to sub-optimization. For example, the improvement of a 
sub-system at the expense of the organization as a whole (Van Loocke & Put, 2010). 
Figure 6: Management and policy cycle as an open system model
  
Source: De Peuter, 2011, 109 
 Accountability 
What is public accountability? 
According to Schillemans & Bovens (2011), a distinction can be made between accountability as a 
virtue and accountability as a social relation or a mechanism. Accountability used in the sense of 
virtue is a normative concept. It refers to a set of standards used to evaluate the behaviour of 
(public) actors. ‘Being accountable’ or ‘acting in an accountable way’ is seen as a positive 
characteristic of public officials or organizations. It is a similar virtue as being responsive and 
responsible, and being willing to act in a transparent and fair way. Accountability defined as a 
social relationship or mechanism, on the other hand, refers to ‘being held accountable’ and 
involves an obligation of an actor to explain and justify its conduct to a significant other 
(Schillemans & Bovens, 2011). In this contribution, we will use accountability in the latter sense. 
4.1 The fundamental notion of accountability 
Many authors have offered theoretical contributions and definitions of accountability. We will 
discuss and compare three of them. We start with the influential definition of the ‘Utrecht School’ 
of accountability3, and consider some amendments and additions made by Lindberg (2013), who 
very recently conducted a literature review about accountability. We then contrast this with the 
dimensions of accountability suggested by Koppell (2005). 
‘Utrecht School’ of accountability & Lindberg 
                                                          
3 Mark Bovens and his colleagues Thomas Schillemans and Paul ‘t Hart. 
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Underlying the concept of accountability, is the principle of delegating authority to an agent, 
evaluating the performance of the agent, and applying sanctions if the performance is 
substandard. To paraphrase Lindberg, the basic idea of accountability is this: when decision-
making power is delegated from a principal to an agent, there must be a mechanism in place to 
hold the agent accountable for its decisions and if necessary to sanction the agent (Lindberg, 
2013). Thus, at a basic level, accountability is closely associated with authority. An actor who is 
merely executing orders without any discretionary power, cannot be a legitimate object of 
accountability (Lindberg, 2013). 
According to the ‘Utrecht School’ of accountability, which has been very influential in the study of 
this topic, accountability can be defined as a relationship between an actor (who can be either an 
individual person or an organization) and a forum (which can be either an individual person, an 
organization or a virtual entity (e.g. a God)) in which the actor has or feels an obligation (which 
can be either formal, informal or even self-imposed) to explain and justify his or her conduct to 
the forum, in which the forum can pose additional questions and pass judgment, after which the 
actor may face consequences (Bovens, Schillemans & ‘t Hart, 2008, 225; Bovens, 2005a, 184-185). 
As Bovens (2005a) indicates, this definition reveals at least three elements of an account giving 
relationship: information, debate and judgment. The element of information implies that the actor 
has or feels an obligation to inform the forum about his or her behaviour or performance. When a 
failure or an incident has occurred, the provision of information is often not sufficient, and has to 
be supplemented with explanation and justification for the failure. In response, the forum may 
initiate a debate with the actor, by discussing and questioning the quality and adequacy of the 
information or the appropriateness and legitimacy of the behaviour. Finally, it is not unusual that 
the forum renders judgment on the behaviour or performance of the actor. Furthermore, a 
negative verdict by the forum may result in some sort of sanction (Bovens, 2005a). 
However, according to Bovens (2005b), not all elements are equally crucial in this definition. In 
essence, in order to qualify a relationship as an accountability relationship, it suffices that the 
actor, has or feels an obligation to inform the forum about his conduct. The accountability 
relationship gains weight when the forum has the possibility to pose further questions and to pass 
judgment about the performance of the actor. The most severe form of accountability arises when 
the forum has the opportunity to impose formal or informal sanctions on the occasion of a 
negative judgment (Bovens, 2005b). 
In addition to the definition of the ‘Utrecht School’, and also somewhat in deviation from it, Staffan 
I Lindberg identifies five defining characteristics of accountability: 
 An agent or institution (A for agent) who has an obligation to give an account 
 An area or domain (D for domain) subject to accountability 
 An agent or institution (P for principal) to whom A has to give account 
 The right of P to require A to inform and explain/justify decisions with regard to D 
The right of P to sanction A if A fails to inform, explain or justify decisions with regard to D 
(Lindberg, 2013). The right of P to sanction A for failing to provide the requested information or 
explanation is considered by Lindberg to be an essential defining characteristic of accountability. 
Lindberg convincingly argues that excluding this right from the definition would reduce the 
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notion of accountability. Indeed, without the possibility of sanctions, decision-makers and actors 
would only disclose and explain their conduct to a level with which they themselves feel 
comfortable (Lindberg, 2013). 
Figure 7: Accountability of the actor by the forum 
 
Source: Bovens, 2005a, 186 
The definition of Lindberg differs somewhat from the definition of the Utrecht School with regard 
to condition 5. In the definition of Lindberg, the right of P to sanction is limited to the right to 
sanction A for failing to provide the requested information or explanation (Lindberg, 2013). In the 
definition of the Utrecht School, by contrast, the right of P to sanction is extended to the right to 
sanction A for (the (in)appropriateness and/or (il)legitimacy of) the conduct itself. However, this 
extension of the definition is mitigated by the fact that Bovens et al. do not consider this right to 
be an essential defining characteristic of accountability (Bovens, 2005b). 
Koppell  
Koppell (2005) proposes five dimensions of accountability: transparency, liability, controllability, 
responsibility, and responsiveness. The first two dimensions of accountability (transparency and 
liability) are considered by Koppell to be fundamental, supporting notions of accountability. 
Transparency refers to the idea that an accountable actor must disclose and/or explain its conduct 
(Koppell, 2005). This dimension is closely related to the ‘information phase’ in the definition of 
the ‘Utrecht School’. Liability refers to the possibility of sanctions: accountable actors may face 
consequences that are attached to performance (Koppell, 2005). 
The other three dimensions of accountability are labelled by Koppell as the substantive 
conceptions of accountability. Controllability refers to the idea that accountable public 
organizations should carry out the will of the people as expressed through their elected 
representatives. The key question is: did the organization follow the orders of its principal? 
Responsibility refers to the idea that accountable public actors should not simply follow orders, 
but should also be guided and constrained in their conduct by laws, rules, norms, and professional 
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and moral standards. Finally, public organizations may be called responsive if they meet the needs 
and demands of the population they are serving (Koppell, 2005). 
Lindberg is sceptical about these three so called substantive conceptions of accountability. He 
argues that controllability, responsibility and responsiveness may be desired outcomes or after-
effects of some types of accountability relationships, but that these conceptions should not be 
understood as integral to the notion of accountability itself (Lindberg, 2013). 
4.2 Classifications of public accountability 
There are many ways to classify types of accountability. According to Bovens (2005b), four 
guiding questions may be asked: Who should give account? To whom? Why? About what? 
The ‘to whom’ question makes a distinction between types of forums. Bovens distinguishes 
between (1) political accountability: account giving along the chain of political principal-agent 
relationships, that is to say towards ministers, elected representatives, and ultimately voters; (2) 
legal accountability: account giving towards civil or administrative courts; (3) administrative 
accountability: account giving towards auditors, ombudsmen, inspectors and controllers; (4) 
professional accountability: account giving towards (associations of) professional peers; and (5) 
societal accountability: account giving towards citizens, interest groups, the media (Bovens, 
2005a, 2005b). 
The who question is referred to by Dennis Thompson as the problem of many hands: “Because 
many different officials contribute in many ways to decisions and policies of government, it is 
difficult even in principle to identify who is morally responsible for political outcomes” (D. 
Thompson, quoted in Bovens, 2005a, p. 189). Bovens identifies a number of accountability 
strategies for forums to deal with the problem of many hands: 
- Corporate accountability: many public organizations are considered to be corporate 
bodies with independent legal status. In this capacity, the organization can be held 
accountable as a unitary actor. Legal and administrative forums often apply this strategy. 
- Hierarchical accountability: this strategy is dominant in organizational and political 
accountability relations. Towards the outside world, the minister or the senior civil 
servant takes complete responsibility for the actions of the units under their authority. 
- Individual accountability: this strategy, which is typical for professional accountability, is 
based on strict individual accountability. Each individual is held accountable for his or her 
personal contribution to the conduct of the organization (Bovens, 2005a, 2005b). 
The why question relates to the nature of the obligation: why does the actor feel compelled to give 
account? Bovens (2005b) makes a distinction between diagonal, vertical and horizontal 
accountability. First of all, the relationship between actor and forum may be a vertical one. If this 
is the case, the forum has formal and hierarchical powers over the actor and can force the actor to 
give account. Most forms of political and legal accountability are characterized by this kind of 
vertical relationship between actor and forum. Alternatively, actor and forum may find 
themselves in a horizontal relationship. When this is the case, there is no formal obligation on 
behalf of the actor to give account. Account is given on a voluntary basis. Societal accountability is 
a typical example of this. Finally, there is the possibility of an intermediate form: diagonal 
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accountability. An accountability relationship may be qualified as diagonal when there is neither 
a strict hierarchical relationship, nor pure voluntariness (Bovens, 2005b). 
Administrative accountability mechanisms frequently qualify as diagonal forms of accountability. 
For example, ombudsmen are often charged by a political principal (a minister or parliament) to 
exercise some kind of oversight over an agent and to report their findings to the principal. There 
is, however, no direct hierarchical relationship between the ombudsman and the organization 
under scrutiny (Bovens, 2005b). Typically, ombudsman offices do not have the right to sanction 
the agents for their actions or to coerce them into compliance. However, they can often use the 
courts to sanction agents if they fail to provide the requested information or explanations 
(Lindberg, 2013). 
Figure 8: Horizontal, vertical and diagonal accountability 
 
 
Source: Bovens, 2005a, 197 
Fourth, one can ask the question about what aspect of the conduct information and explanation is 
required. Some accountability arrangements may focus on legal compliance, while others may 
focus on financial correctness, and still others on the efficiency and effectiveness of the policy. 
Another possible distinction is that between accountability for the process and accountability for 
the product (Bovens, 2005b). 
The four guiding questions of Bovens may be supplemented by two additional dimensions, raised 
by Radin & Romzek (1996) and echoed by Lindberg (2013). A first dimension relates to the source 
of the accountability relationship. The accountability holder (or principal) can be internal or 
external to the agent being held accountable. For example, when a manager of an agency asks his 
or her subordinates to justify their behaviour, the source of the accountability relationship is 
internal. On the other hand, when voters hold their representatives to account, the source of the 
accountability relationship can be labelled as external. The second dimension is the degree of 
control exercised by the forum over the actor. This may vary from extremely detailed control and 
close scrutiny based on specific rules and regulations, to highly diffuse control and minimal 
scrutiny (Lindberg, 2013; Koppell, 2005). 
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In addition to these six guiding questions, we would like to include a seventh one: the degree of 
publicness of the account giving. Pure public accountability is done in public. This means that the 
account giving is not done discretely, behind closed doors, but instead that it is open or at least 
accessible to citizens and the general public. Information about the conduct of the agent is widely 
available, the interrogations and debates are accessible to the public and the forum discloses its 
judgment (Bovens, 2005a). However, most organizational forms of accountability are strictly 
speaking not public. The account giving done by civil servants towards their superiors is a form 
of internal account giving which is usually not accessible to the public at large (Bovens, 2005a). 
Nevertheless, these internal, organizational forms of accountability can also be important levers 
or inhibitors for organizational learning and change. 
4.3 The functions of accountability mechanisms 
Central to the concept of accountability, is the idea that when decision-making power is 
transferred from a principal to an agent, there must be a mechanism in place for holding the agent 
accountable for its decisions and if necessary to sanction the agent (Lindberg, 2013). Therefore, 
the first and foremost function of public accountability is democratic control and oversight by the 
political principal over the delegated powers exercised by their agents (Bovens, 2005a, 2005b). 
In recent decades, the rise of (quasi) autonomous agencies has weakened the ministerial powers 
of oversight and control, thereby undermining the principle of ministerial responsibility, and 
creating a political accountability gap. Indeed, ministers remain formally answerable to 
parliament for the performance of these agencies, yet in practice, they are structurally uninformed 
about their day to day operations. Partly in reaction to this rising accountability gap, ombudsmen 
and audit offices have been created as auxiliary mechanisms to aid political principals to oversee 
their administrative agents (Bovens, 2005a). 
A second function of public accountability is to protect and/or enhance the integrity of public 
governance. The assumption is that, by securing information disclosure and justification, public 
managers are deterred from misusing their delegated powers (Bovens, 2005a).  
A third crucial function is the learning and improvement function of accountability mechanisms 
(Aucoin & Heintzman, 2000). Indeed, many ombudsmen and audit offices explicitly indicate in 
their mission statements that their goal is not only to oversee government performance, but also 
to help public service organizations to improve their performance (Van Loocke & Put, 2010). In 
the next section, we will explore in what ways accountability arrangements can foster learning 
behaviour and improvement in public sector organizations. 
4.3 The potential contribution of (administrative) accountability 
mechanisms  
In this section, we will argue that a number of features of accountability mechanisms have the 
potential to foster learning, improvement, and innovation in public sector organizations. These 
features are notably: the provision of feedback information, the provocation of reflection, the 
provocation of debate, the public nature of the account giving, and the possibility of sanctions 
and/or rewards. The former three features relate to the cognitive development of public sector 
organizations. The latter two pertain to the behavioural dimension of learning: the motivation of 
public sector organizations to pursue actual improvements and changes. 
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Information, reflection, and debate  
In the accountability literature, it is argued that a public accountability arrangement, if organized 
in an appropriate way, confronts public managers on a regular basis with feedback information 
about their own organization and stimulates both ‘accountors’ and ‘accountees’ to reflect upon 
and to debate about the successes and failures of past policies, both separately and in dialogue 
with one another (Bovens, 2005b, 47; Bovens, Schillemans & ‘t Hart, 2008, 233). The literature 
about learning teaches us that these three features – the provision of feedback information, the 
provocation of reflection, and the provocation of debate – may induce cognitive development and 
thus learning. 
To begin with, the provision of feedback about past performances is crucial to corrective system 
learning. Indeed, on the basis of information about the outcomes and effectiveness of its actions, 
a policy actor can correct its errors and improve its overall functioning (Van der Knaap, 1995). 
Moreover, the stimuli emanating from the feedback information may lead to the feeling of 
cognitive dissonance which may induce the policy actor to reflect on the appropriateness of 
policies and their underlying policy theories (Van der Knaap, 1995). 
In the definition of accountability by the Utrecht School, information about the actions of the actor 
is provided by the actor to the forum. However, in the case of administrative accountability forums 
such as ombudsmen and audit offices, the feedback information will often be gathered and 
processed by the forum. Ideally, the forum gathers information about the actions of the actor, 
processes this information into a clear and accurate diagnosis of important performance 
dimensions, and confronts the actor with it. Subsequently, the accountability arrangement may 
provide a setting which allows the initiation of a debate between the actors, the forum, and key 
stakeholders about past performances of the actor (Bovens, Schillemans & ‘t Hart, 2008). 
In this debating phase, alternative viewpoints may be confronted, and mutual efforts of 
persuasion and argumentation may be made. In this way, the individuals participating in the 
dialectic connection are stimulated to reflect on their existing cognitive schemata (Van der Knaap, 
1995). 
Furthermore, by providing a potential dissonant voice, the forum might break the possible 
conformist patterns of thought within the organization under scrutiny (D’hoedt & Bouckaert, 
2011). Indeed, organizations tend to persist in what they do because the members of an 
organization often share the same set of beliefs and values, and because it occurs to no-one to 
question the existing ways of doing things. Sources from outside the organization are often 
thought to be in a better position to challenge existing perspectives and paradigms, and to 
question long-held assumptions and behaviours (Lam, 2006; Salge & Vera, 2012). Accountability 
mechanisms such as ombudsmen and audit offices, which are thought to be independent 
institutions, seem to be in an appropriate position to provide such a voice if necessary. In short, 
accountability mechanisms may challenge the status quo by provoking open mindedness and 
reflection in political and administrative systems that might otherwise be primarily inward-
looking (in ‘t Veld et al., 1991 – in Bovens, Schillemans & ‘t Hart, 2008). 
The public nature of the account giving and the possibility of sanctions  
The public nature of the account giving may foster competition 
The provision of feedback information and alternative viewpoints, and the provocation of 
reflection and debate may contribute to the cognitive development of public sector organizations: 
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i.e. the developments of insights and cognitive associations, change in states of knowledge, and 
increased understanding of causal relationships. However, new insights and ideas are not always 
turned into new practices. A necessary condition for the conversion of new ideas into new 
practices is the willingness of public sector organizations to improve. 
This willingness should be inherent to the government. Indeed, the power to govern a people 
comes from the people. As a consequence, every government has the inherent obligation to govern 
its subjects as well as possible (Van Gunsteren, 1985). This implies that a government should 
always try to improve its public policies and services (Van der Knaap, 1995). 
However, many observers indicate that competition is one of the most important incentives for 
improvement and innovation (cf. supra). Organizations in a competitive environment can only 
survive if they are able to create new products, new services, more efficient production methods, 
better and more efficient ways of delivering services, and so on. It is argued that since the public 
sector lacks competition, it also lacks incentives to improve and to innovate (Bekkers et al., 2011). 
Bekkers et al. (2013) observed that other scholars disagree. They indicate that, although 
government is mainly in a monopolistic position, there is a trend of increasing market-like 
competition in the public sector. For example, due to the privatization and liberalization of specific 
service domains, which were formerly the exclusive terrain of government, public sector 
organizations increasingly have to compete with private organizations (Bekkers et al., 2013). As 
a consequence, public sector organizations increasingly have to pay attention to the quality, 
effectiveness, efficiency and responsiveness of their services in order to survive. Secondly, 
Bekkers et al. (2013) indicate that regions and cities are increasingly competing with each other 
in terms attracting citizens, tourists, etc. The quality of services is an important source of 
competitive advantage is this contest (Bekkers et al., 2013). Thirdly, due to the decline of the 
importance of ideology and due to the depillarisation, voters have become increasingly footloose, 
pushing political parties to attract voters with the promise and proof of good governance (Bekkers 
et al., 2013). In other words, the improvement of the quality, effectiveness, efficiency and 
responsiveness of services and policies has increasingly become an issue of competition between 
regions, cities and political parties. 
Moreover, several arrangements have been developed that make the quality and outcomes of 
public services more transparent. As a consequence, the performances of public sector entities 
are increasingly subject to comparison, both within the public sector and between the public and 
the private sector. Obvious examples of such arrangements are benchmarking systems and league 
tables (Bekkers et al., 2013). However, public accountability arrangements such as ombudsmen 
and audit offices may also provide such transparency. Indeed, the account giving is done in public, 
meaning that it is open or at least accessible to citizens (Bovens, 2005a). The fact that the quality 
and outcomes of public services and policies are made transparent, in combination with the 
increase of (quasi-)competitive elements in the public sector, may act as an incentive for service 
improvements (Bekkers et al., 2013). 
However, there is also a downside to this transparency and competition. As Hartley & Benington 
(2006) rightfully point out, the increased competition between public sector organizations is 
detrimental to the possibilities of inter-organizational learning. Exactly because public sector 
organizations are increasingly subjected to competition over reputation and resources, they tend 
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to become less willing to share good practices, experiences, ideas and knowledge, which puts a 
brake on the dissemination of successful innovations (Hartley & Benington, 2006). 
The possibility of sanctions and/or rewards may motivate public authorities to raise their games 
Not only may the public nature of the account giving constitute an incentive for public managers 
to do better. The possibility of getting sanctioned for errors or shortcomings may also motivate 
public authorities to reevaluate their products and processes, and to search for more efficient 
and/or effective manners of organizing them (Bovens, Schillemans and Hart, 2008).  
This argument was worked out in a detailed fashion by Wynen, Verhoest, Ongaro & van Thiel 
(2014). In fact, Wynen et al. assert that this idea is at the core of NPM: 
“In exchange for autonomy, public organizations (or their CEOs) would be held 
accountable by their minister and parliament for their performance and sanctioned 
or rewarded accordingly. […] It was believed that an increase in managerial autonomy 
combined with result control would, among others, stimulate a more innovation-
oriented culture and ultimately lead to an increase of performance” (Wynen et al., 
2014, 45). 
In essence, the argument can be summarized as ‘letting managers manage’, and ‘making managers 
manage’. Managerial autonomy provides public managers with the possibility and the latitude to 
experiment, to innovate, and to manage. As a complement, result control provides public 
managers with the pressure and the incentive to do so. Indeed, holding agencies accountable for 
their performance and linking result-achievement with sanctions and rewards stimulates or even 
forces managers to pursue higher levels of performance, quality and efficiency. This pressure may 
result in an (intensified) search for innovative ways to deliver services and to organize processes 
(Wynen et al., 2014). 
However, an accountability regime which is too rigorous and focuses too harshly on mistakes and 
sanctions, may discourage entrepreneurship, risk-taking, initiative and creativity. Mistakes and 
failures are part of any learning process. Innovation can be seen as a journey which is not linear 
and rational but which leads to dead-ends, mistakes, setbacks, and obstacles. When an 
accountability mechanism focuses to harshly on sanctions for making ‘mistakes’ or for not 
realizing immediate results, public managers will learn to avoid risk-taking, and to shield 
themselves against potential mistakes and criticism (Van Loocke & Put, 2010; Bovens, 2005a; 
Behn, 2001; Bekkers et al., 2013; Hartley, 2005). 
In addition, performance targets that are too static, may lead to the continuation of existing ways 
of working, to stagnation, and to the inhibition of innovation (Wynen et al., 2014). 
Why do (administrative) accountability mechanisms have the potential to stifle learning 
and innovation in public sector organizations? 
Thus far, we have discussed the possible ways in which (administrative) accountability 
mechanisms may contribute to learning, improvement, and innovation in public sector 
organizations. We should, however, take into account that accountability mechanisms, when 
organized in an inappropriate way, may also have detrimental effects on learning, improvement, 
and innovation. In this section, we will briefly discuss some possible dysfunctions of 
accountability mechanisms, insofar as they are relevant to the goal of learning and improving. 
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 Formalism and goal displacement. An accountability regime which is too rigorous, may 
turn public institutions into formalistic bureaucracies which are obsessed with conformity 
with rules and procedures. Instead of a means to provide insight in and reflection about 
performances and processes, the account giving may become a goal in itself (Bovens & ‘t 
Hart, 2005). 
 Perverted behaviour and window dressing. An accountability regime which is too 
rigorous, may encourage perverted behaviour. Public managers may get better at fulfilling 
the requirements imposed by their accountability forums. However this does not 
necessarily mean that the actual performance of these public organizations in terms of 
policy-making and public service delivery will also improve. The managers may create a 
façade of plans, procedures and goals to satisfy the forum, while behind the façade, 
everything continues as before (Van Loocke & Put, 2010; Bovens, Schillemans & ‘t Hart, 
2008). 
 Tunnel vision and sub-optimization. Accountability forums may systematically focus on 
certain aspects, while ignoring others. For example, focusing on performance, but ignoring 
legality; focusing on technical aspects, but ignoring human aspects. Furthermore, a scope 
which is too limited, may lead to sub-optimization. For example, the improvement of a 
sub-system at the expense of the organization as a whole (Van Loocke & Put, 2010). 
 Rigidity and paralysis. An accountability regime which is too rigorous and focuses too 
harshly on mistakes and sanctions, may discourage entrepreneurship, risk-taking, 
initiative and creativity. Mistakes and failures are part of any learning process. Innovation 
can be seen as a journey which is not linear and rational but which leads to dead-ends, 
mistakes, setbacks, and obstacles. When an accountability mechanism focuses to harshly 
on sanctions for making ‘mistakes’ or for not realizing immediate results, public managers 
will learn to avoid risk-taking, and to shield themselves against potential mistakes and 
criticism (Van Loocke & Put, 2010; Bovens, 2005a; Behn, 2001; Bekkers et al., 2013; 
Hartley, 2005). 
 Conflicting expectations. Actors may be confronted with different accountability forums, 
each with its own set of evaluation criteria. These sets may be partially overlapping, but 
also partially diverging, and even mutually contradictory. It may be difficult to combine 
these different expectations or to prioritize between them. As a consequence, 
organizations trying to meet conflicting expectations are likely to end up in a state of 
dysfunctional paralysis. They tend to oscillate between behaviours which are consistent 
with conflicting notions of accountability (Schillemans & Bovens, 2011; Koppell, 2005; 
Bovens, Schillemans & ‘t Hart, 2008). 
  Conclusion 
If the above literature review is to make one thing clear, it is that Feedback, Accountability and 
Learning are extremely complex and multi-facetted concepts. It is therefore perhaps necessary to 
sum up the most significant factors. A complete, schematic overview, can be found in the annex. 
For Learning, the idea of individual and organizational learning are strongly intertwined.  
Concepts such as cybernetics, organizational memory and knowledge management strongly focus 
on the organizational level, whereas psychological safety and social learning (amongst others) 
lean more towards the individual level of learning. The fact of the matter is that organizations are 
made up of individuals, that individuals function within structures, hierarchies and organizations, 
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and that both levels influence each other. By looking at inter-organizational learning, we can add 
a third level as well. Just as people learn from other people, organizations can learn from other 
organizations. How people and organizations learn from their own and others’ past experiences 
can strongly influence the potential for innovation. Doing something new, and improving standing 
processes and/or products requires learning from the past and the status quo. As logical as this 
sounds, this is complex when one dives into the literature. Learning is perhaps the most 
elaborately researched dimension in our FAL-model, resulting in the largest number of factors to 
potentially influence social innovation. 
Feedback is an equally indispensable part of the internal processes in an organization’s endeavour 
to innovate. Although fewer concepts have been put forward by the literature regarding feedback, 
most are multifaceted. Besides the effect of feedback on goals and objectives (Cybernetics), 
organizations can build mental and physical walls when receiving feedback information 
(Autopoiesis). Finally, the source of the feedback and the focus of the feedback can greatly 
contribute to the effect it has on innovation processes. Feedback forms a step prior to learning 
and innovation. Before learning and innovation can take place, getting information, from which 
you can then learn, is obviously essential. The question remains where this information comes 
from. 
One of the places where feedback information can be derived from is an accountability 
mechanism, or several of these mechanisms. Being held accountable obligates an organization to 
self-evaluate, and external accountability provides the organization with feedback information on 
its performance. Who specifically is held accountable, to whom one is held accountable, and the 
degree of publicness of this accountability process are only a few of the factors which determine 
how this dimension influences the innovation processes of public organizations.  
Together, Feedback, Accountability and Learning form integral parts of a cyclical process in which 
an organization self-evaluates, receives information, perceives it, and learns from it. Or not. The 
question which remains now is how these dimensions actually function within public 
organizations. When we put this mechanism as simply as possible, it means that the non-existence 
of the FAL-model within an organization, leads to the non-existence of sustainable social 
innovation. Or, put in more logical terms: 
F + A + L   Sustainable Social Innovations (1) 
¬ F + ¬ A + ¬ L  ¬ Sustainable Social Innovations (0) 
The above summed-up FAL-model will need to be translated into survey questions, and a further 
methodology will need to be designed in order to measure the factors in public organizations, to 
connect these factors with concrete innovations, and finally to assess the influence of other, 
external factors on the innovations and innovation processes of public sector organizations. These 
steps were all taken during the LIPSE research of Working Package 3, and was published in the 
research report, which can be accessed on www.lipse.org/publications. Most of the steps in the 
research efforts to unravel these processes and phenomenon will be published in other working 
papers in this series.  
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 Annex 
 
Learning 
 
Concept Dimensions  
Cybernetics Single-loop learning Active measurement of a wide spectrum of performance 
Double-loop learning Questioning the appropriateness of the goals and 
objectives 
Deutero learning Institutionalized capacity to learn 
Individual cognitive 
learning & social 
learning 
Cognitive dissonance 
and confrontation of 
viewpoints 
General openness that encourages questioning, inquiry 
and constructive criticism 
Openness for feedback information, for alternative 
opinions and perspectives 
Tolerance for uncertainty: allowing cognitive dissonance 
The arousal of 
reflection and debate 
Internal platforms, arenas, forums to discuss and debate 
-Psychological 
safety  
-Defensive routines  
-Error/risk-
avoidance 
Tolerance for errors Sense of safety about making errors and discussing them 
openly 
No-blame culture 
Trust-based culture 
Organizational 
memory 
 
Knowledge 
management 
Organizational 
memory 
Archives 
Documentation of procedures 
Knowledge 
management 
Making tacit knowledge explicit 
Recording, conservation and retrieval of knowledge and 
experience 
Creating, acquiring, capturing, aggregating, codifying, 
sharing and using knowledge 
 
Exploitation vs. 
exploration 
Exploration Large variety of relevant skills and knowledge that can 
be exploited 
Personnel turnover 
Exploitation Focus on routinization, refinement, reliability 
Focus on the elaboration of existing experiences and 
skills 
 
Feedback 
Open system / organism 
metaphor 
Adaptiveness, alignment 
Autopoiesis Perception filter 
Closing off from impulses from outside in order to shield itself from 
excessive turbulence and complexity 
Closing off from impulses from outside after a period of adaptation and 
innovation 
Cybernetics / self-
regulation 
Clear performance goals and objectives 
Monitoring and comparing 
Corrective action 
Questioning the appropriateness of the goals and objectives 
43 
 
Organizational locus of 
informational subsystems 
The necessity of an informational subsystem 
The optimal place for reporting intelligence 
Source of the feedback Staff – stakeholders – monitoring – policy evaluations – ombudsmen 
reports – (performance) audits – … 
Variety of sources 
Focus of the feedback Goal-seeking vs. goal-changing feedback (cf. single-loop vs. double loop 
learning) 
Internal design vs. relationship with the environment 
Functioning of a subsystem vs. functioning of the total system 
 
Accountability 
Who is held accountable? The organization as a whole – the senior civil servant – the individual civil 
servant – … 
To whom? To administrative superiors – to the minister, parliament, voters – to 
ombudsmen, auditors, inspectors, … – … 
About which aspect of the 
administrative 
performance? 
Legal compliance – financial correctness – efficiency and efficacy – … 
Nature of the obligation Formal obligation vs. voluntariness 
Degree of publicness Discrete and behind closed doors vs. open or at least accessible to citizens 
and the general public 
The functions of 
accountability 
mechanisms 
Democratic control and oversight – integrity – learning and improvement 
The dysfunctions of 
accountability 
mechanisms 
Accountability overload: number of accountability mechanisms & 
conflicting expectations 
Focusing too harshly on mistakes and sanctions => perverted behavior, 
window dressing, error- and risk-avoidance,… 
Systematically focusing on certain aspects, while ignoring others => tunnel 
vision and sub-optimization 
 
 
 
 
